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ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance 
elements and relational capital disclosure. This study analyses 229 annual 
reports of companies in the technology industry that are listed on the Main 
and ACE Market of Bursa Malaysia. The results indicate that multiple 
directorships, institutional and government ownerships positively affect 
relational capital disclosure. Managerial ownership, on the other hand, 
reduces the incentives of the management to signal such information. 
In addition, we also find younger companies to have more incentives to 
disclose relational capital information compared to more established 
companies. Contrary from past research, this study used a conceptual 
model developed based on network theory that suggests companies have 
an incentive to increase their competitive advantage by increasing network 
between organizations. This study is the first of its kind that specifically 
investigates the association between relational capital disclosures with 
the corporate governance practices. The results highlight that important 
corporate governance determinants of relational capital disclosure can be 
predicted when signaling intention of the board and network arguments are 
considered. The findings are useful for regulators in emerging countries 
characterized by highly networked economy, whereby, business and personal 
networks are important for company sustainability. 
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual capital1 is regarded as the most important resource for companies 
to have competitive advantage. It affects the internal level of innovation and 
creativity as well as improves the company performance (Nik Muhammad, 
Md Isa & Nik Ismail, 2006). The intellectual capital disclosure in the 
company includes disclosure with regards to its components, namely 
human, structure and relationship capitals.2 This information is beneficial for 
investors to reduce uncertainties about the company future prospects, risks 
and facilitate company valuation (Bukh, 2003). The company inability to 
present value creation activity in financial report (Lev & Zarowin, 1999) via 
intellectual capital information increases information asymmetry between 
financial firms and users (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Information asymmetry 
results in inefficient resource allocation in capital market (Li, Pike & Haniffa, 
2008) and increases capital cost.
Relationship capital includes the relationship between organization 
and external parties such as customers, competitors, suppliers and the 
Government (Bontis, Chua & Richardson, 2000). Relationship capital 
is the key component to intellectual capital, which is often disclosed in 
annual report. Past research on intellectual capital in Ireland (Brennan, 
2001), Italy (Bozzolan, Favotto & Ricceri, 2003), Sri Lanka (Abeysekara 
& Guthrie, 2005) and Malaysia (Goh & Lim, 2004) show that companies 
tend to reveal about relational capital as compared to other intellectual 
capital components. However, no studies regarding factors that contributes 
to relational capital disclosure. As such, previous studies that examine the 
factors contributing to intellectual capital disclosure have inconsistent 
results. The inconsistency of findings may due to different factors that 
determine different types of disclosure. That is, the important factors that 
determine relational capital disclosure may from human and structural 
aspects are different. For example, Boards have the inclination to disclose 
their friendship with CEO because it can improve the shareholders’ 
1 Intellectual capital is defined as intangible assets, including technology, information, customers, 
reputation and corporate culture that contribute to firms’ competitive advantage (Low and Kalafut, 
2002)
2 Human capital is the ability or efficiency of human resources including skills, experience and 
background of an employee, the structural capital includes database, organization hierarchy, manual 
processes, strategy, work schedule as well as the mechanisms that help the work process, while the 
relational capital covers the whole relationship between organizations and outsiders such as customers, 
competitors, suppliers and the Government (Bontis, 2001)
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perception regarding the decision that they make (Rose, Rose, Norman & 
Mazza, 2014). Therefore, incentives for disclosure are specific to the type 
of information disclosed. The Managers or Directors is expected to receive 
certain incentives in revealing other types of relational information. This 
expectation is made when incentives are examined in specific from specific 
theoretical viewpoint and the items are developed to measure relational 
capital. Companies are motivated to provide relational capital disclosure to 
reduce uncertainties among investors and minimise agency cost.
Due to this argument, this study expects that the relational capital 
disclosure determinants can be detected via corporate relationship model, 
which is jointly used with the signaling and agency theories. A corporate 
relationship model is adopted from Goerzen (2007). From previous 
studies, corporate governance3 practice is proven to affect the company 
disclosure practice (for example. Mine & Hassan, 2016; Beekes, Brown & 
Qiyu, 2015), thus the objective of this study is to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance elements (such as the characteristics of 
Board of Directors and the company ownership structure) and relational 
capital disclosure.
In comparison to previous studies, this study is different in several 
respects. First, past research develop disclosure index based on user 
perception. The use of such approach is deficient due to the information 
deem important is not useful to drive company growth and competitive 
advantage. Consequently, managers may not have the intention to 
signal the information. Different from past research, this study used the 
conceptual model proposed by Goerzen (2007) to select elements and 
items of disclosure. A conceptual model by Goerzen (2007) is developed 
based on network theory, suggesting that companies have the incentive 
to increase their competitive advantage by improving network between 
organizations. This model suggests that elements such as networking size, 
international network experience, geographical networking diversification 
and repeated network are the networking elements that can enhance company 
performance. Therefore, when these elements are met, the company have 
an incentive to provide signal (in accordance with the signaling theory) to 
3 Corporate governance can be defined as the processes and structures used to manage the affairs of 
the company in order to enhance corporate performance and accountability with the goal of realizing 
the long term value for shareholders and the interests of others (Lee, 2003).
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the market about which network that can lead to competitive advantage for 
company in the industry. 
Second, this study views the relationship between corporate 
governance and relational capital disclosure from different point of view, 
which is from the angle of signaling. Consequently, this study is the first 
of its kind that specifically investigates the association between relational 
capital disclosure and corporate governance practice. The predictions 
are made based on signaling intention of corporate board and owners. 
Third, Malaysia is used as the setting because network is important for 
businesses in this country, which is also labelled as “relationship-based 
economy” (Adhikari, Derashid & Zhang, 2006). Within this context, a 
formal test on the effect of young, high growth technology companies 
(versus a more established technology companies) listed on the Malaysian 
ACE and Main market was conducted. It is predicted that the young, 
high growth technology companies have less reliance, thus they tend to 
disclose relational capital as compared to other established companies. The 
young, high growth technology companies often have insufficient internal 
resource and capabilities than established companies (Xiong & Bharadwaj, 
2011). In addition, the young companies with limited performance record 
and relational capital can provide observable signal to investors (Xiong 
& Bharadwaj, 2011). The signal in the long run also turns into corporate 
reputation (Florin, Lubatkin & Schulze, 2003). Thus, such setting provides 
enough incentive for companies to provide relational capital disclosure.
The significance of this study is that it sheds light and provides 
additional explanation to relational capital disclosure practice made by 
companies from a different perspective i.e. signaling and agency. We 
believe that investigation on corporate disclosure must be made on specific 
issue. By doing this, specific disclosure incentive (in specific signaler - 
some corporate governance mechanisms) can be identified and tested. In 
addition, specific disclosure items are derived from a justified framework 
i.e. in this case network perspective. The study may prove that the use of 
only agency theory is unable to describe the relational capital disclosure 
practice. Thus, agency theory is used in conjunction with signaling theory 
to predict the disclosure of relational capital information that can give 
competitive advantage to the companies.
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This paper is arranged as follows; the next section discusses the past 
research and formulation of hypotheses. The section is followed by research 
method. Section four is for analysis and discussion, followed by the fifth 
section, which the conclusion of the study.
PAST RESEARCH AND FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESIS
Relational capital includes the organizational development elements such 
as relationship between company and customers, competitors, suppliers 
and the government (Bontis, 2001). Prior studies show that the relationship 
increases company stock market performance (Kalaignanam, Shankar 
& Varadarajan 2007; Swaminathan & Moorman 2009) and corporate 
reputation (Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze 2003). Due to its importance, 
relational capital disclosure is provided in the annual report as compared to 
other intellectual capital components such as human and structural capitals 
(Brennan, 2001; Bozzolan, Favotto & Ricceri, 2003; Goh & Lim, 2004; 
Abeysekara & Guthrie 2005). Disclosure of relational capital information, 
as part of voluntary disclosure, results in reduction in capital and debt 
cost, there is an increase of trade transaction securities. Nevertheless, there 
are no studies that look at factors that contribute to the relational capital 
disclosure. Most studies which examined the factors that contribute to 
intellectual capital disclosure as an aggregate measure of human, structural 
and relational capital found inconsistent results. The inconsistency is caused 
by the difference of factors that determine relational capital disclosure from 
human and structural capitals. 
Information regarding company relationship (relational capital) 
is considered as private as this piece of information is not measureable 
or quantifiable and its disclosure in the financial statement is not made 
mandatory. It is worth looking at this issue from signaling and agency 
theories’ point of view. Consistent with signaling theory, managers 
with superior knowledge of company information have the tendency to 
communicate the information through voluntary disclosure to user. The 
intention to provide additional disclosure voluntarily comes from the 
benefits that are described above. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that private information signaling can reduce agency cost and hence the 
financing cost. In addition, reduction of information asymmetry between 
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the provider and users of corporate information results in improvement 
of company reputation, making the stocks more attractive for investment. 
Thus, relational capital disclosure maximizes firm value and consequently, 
increases aggregate effect of the contracting parties. Therefore, board of 
directors that represent shareholders are expected to demand such disclosure 
to be provided as it improves company value. Traditionally, internal 
corporate governance mechanism influences information disclosure, which 
includes board size, independence, multiple directorship and ownership 
structure. In addition, the internal mechanism is directly involved in, or at 
least has pressure on, the decision to disclose relational capital information. 
However, other external board mechanisms such as market for corporate 
control, regulations, labor and market for products may serve as additional 
explanatory variables that affect disclosure in general. These factors are not 
focused in this study because investigation of each effect requires research 
to be carried out in a specific context. Therefore, the effect of board size, 
independence, multiple directorship and ownership structure are discussed.
Board Size
According to agency theory, a well-functioned board of directors is 
central in good corporate governance. The board is a mechanism where 
the principal (mainly shareholders) can monitor the agent (management). 
Company performance that is run by management can be scrutinized in a 
board meeting. Among important characteristics of the board is the board 
size. There are two main effects of board size, first is the board ability in 
decision-making increases as the board member increases, and second, 
the board internal coordination lower when the number of board members 
is excessive. Prior research show that large size board increases decision 
quality (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Alfraih, 2016; Omair Alotaibi & 
Hussainey, 2016) and lowers CEO domination (Zhou & Chen, 2004). 
However, recent evidence not rooted from the agency and resource based 
view suggests otherwise (Torchia & Calabrò, 2016). As board decides the 
level of disclosure, the issues arise is whether board members can influence 
the relational capital disclosure level, which reduces information asymmetry 
and agency cost. 
As number of board members increases, more stakeholders are 
represented. Therefore, demand for information disclosure from different 
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types of stakeholders is viable in a large board. In addition, as the board 
size grows, the board members can help the company to engage in more 
relationship. As such, the company have to disclose the relationship to 
the stakeholders. Due to the benefits, the board is willing to disclose this 
information. Thus, the larger the board, the higher the level of relational 
capital disclosure and hence the lower information asymmetry between 
company and information users (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). 
H1:		 There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	board	size	and	relational	
capital	disclosure.	
Board Independence
Independent nonexecutive directors are in a better position to monitor 
the management (Cotter & Silvester, 2003). Consistent with agency 
theory, independent nonexecutive directors on the board become a control 
mechanism over the management to make sure the latter acts in the interest 
of shareholders, including the minority. Independent directors are related 
to effective company monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and 
company value maximisation (Bueno, Salmador & Rodríguez, 2004).  As 
such, it is expected that the directors have the incentive to monitor company 
disclosure so that stakeholders receive sufficient signal about a company 
for them to make an informed decision. In addition, independent board 
members who represent stakeholders balance the majority owners or block 
holders who have their representative on the board. As such, the demand 
for information from stakeholders can be channeled through independent 
directors in the board meeting. Consistent with this, prior research found that 
companies with higher proportion of independent nonexecutive members 
on the board tend to disclose intellectual capital voluntarily (Eng & Mak, 
2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Li, Pike & Haniffa, 2008; Patelli & Prencipe, 
2007; Lim, Matolcsy & Chow, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Alfraih, 2016; Torchia 
& Calabrò, 2016). 
In line with agency and signaling theories, an increase in the proportion 
of independent directors on the board, the relational capital disclosure is 
likely to increase. The prediction is as follows:
H2:	 There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	board	independence	and	
relational	capital	disclosure.	
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Multiple Directorships
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) define multiple directorships as the 
existence of directors who sit on more than one board. In Malaysia, multiple 
directorships is a common practice among the public listed companies 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Prior research found that large companies tend to 
have multiple directorships than small companies to form more relationships 
with external parties (Booth & Deli, 1996). However, too many directorships 
limit the ability of directors to provide meaningful contribution to the 
company because of time constraint (Benson, Davidson, Davidson & Wang, 
2015). As such, multiple directorships is not usually beneficial to companies. 
The research on multiple directorships and firm performance in 
Malaysia (except for Tan, 2005; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) is limited. Tan 
(2005) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) found that multiple directorships 
improve company performance. This study suggests that multiple 
directorships help companies in developing relationship with external 
parties. The relationship leads to networking that can be utilized by 
companies in increasing their performance. The signaling point of view 
suggests that, these networks are important assets to the companies, so 
it is expected that managers have the intention to provide signal to users. 
Therefore, consistent with Alfraih (2016), we expect that as multiple 
directorships increases, disclosure of relationship capital increases.
H3:		 There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	multiple	directorships	
and	relational	capital	disclosure.	
Ownership Structure
Ownership structure is another important factor that can determine 
corporate disclosure level. In this study, the impact of ownership structure 
in terms of management, family, institution and government ownership on 
relationship capital disclosure is analysed.
Managerial Ownership
Managerial ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the 
management (Eng & Mak, 2003).  This practice reduces agency problem 
because managerial share ownership helps to align the managers’ interest 
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with the owners. Therefore, consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
companies owned by the management tend to disclosure information than 
other firms to increase the company liquidity. However, higher ownership 
by managers reduces the necessity to provide voluntary disclosure, resulting 
in lower disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Mohd Ghazali, 2007; Chau & Gray 
2010; Haddad, AlShattarat, AbuGhazaleh, & Nobanee, 2015). The findings 
are consistent with signaling theory, in which the owners have inadequate 
motivation to signal information to outsiders as their share ownership 
increases. As such, it is expected that as managerial ownership increases, 
relational capital disclosure decreases.
H4:	 There	is	a	negative	relationship	between	managerial	ownership	
and	relational	capital	disclosure.	
Family Ownership
The presence of family ownership and family members on the board of 
directors are traditional characteristics of businesses in Malaysia (Claessens, 
Djankov & Lang, 2000; Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), and other Asian 
countries (Ho & Wong, 2011). Prior literature such as Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Chow and Gray (2010) and Al-
Akra and Hutchinsons (2013) and Haddad, AlShattarat, AbuGhazaleh and 
Nobanee (2015) found evidence that family influence in company influence 
voluntary disclosure practice downwards. This practice is consistent with 
two effects i.e. alignment effect versus entrenchment effect. Alignment 
effect of family ownership and majority of other shareholders reduces the 
intention to signal information. The demand for disclosure is reduced since 
a significant shareholding portion is held by family members. Thus, the 
motivation to disclose information to get better external financing contracts 
gets lesser. The trust and culture among family members become a factor that 
reduces signaling motivation. However, according to entrenchment effect, 
the positioning of family members on board and management team leads 
to improper governance practice, which results in expropriation activities. 
Therefore, Fan and Wong (2002) and Francis, Schipper and Vincent 
(2005) stated that such activity causes the owners to limit information 
flow to external parties to conceal their activities from being known by 
the outsiders. The family blocks their relational information to others 
because any relationship or connection may uncover their expropriation 
38
malaysian accounting review, volume 15 no. 1, 2016
such as tunneling activities. This argument implies that family owners may 
block or reduce relationship or connection signal to external parties. Thus, 
both arguments suggest that an increase family ownership result in lower 
relational capital disclosure.
H5:	 There	is	a	negative	relationship	between	family	ownership	and	
relational	capital	disclosure
Institutional Ownership
Ten largest companies in Malaysia are owned by institutional investors 
(Saleh, Zulkifli & Muhamad, 2010). In fact, institutional investors play 
crucial role in economic development by designing governance in the 
investee companies. Part of the governance process is to monitor the 
progress and performance of investee companies for corporate transparency 
and disclosure (David & Kochhar, 1996; Saleh, Zulkifli & Muhamad, 
2010). Kim, Kitsabunnarat and Nofsinger (2004) suggest that voluntary 
disclosure is used as a mechanism by institutional investors to monitor 
companies. In addition, institutional investors invest on behalf of retail 
investors. Therefore, institutional investors are more aware of information 
demand from the retail investors. As such, prior studies found a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and institutional investors 
(Barako, Hancok & Izan, 2006; Magena & Pike, 2005). Consistent with 
this finding, Iatridis (2013) found that quality disclosure is associated with 
institutional ownership. Overall, it is concluded that the information demand 
to monitor companies by institutional investors motivates companies to 
signal their private information in the form of voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, a higher voluntary disclosure also attracts more investment from 
institutional investors as company reputation increases. The company 
reputation increases if the information disclosure proves that the business is 
well accepted by the reputable business partners. It is proven that corporate 
reputation in regards to relational capital affects company competitive 
advantage (Wang, 2014). Therefore, an increase in institutional ownership 
results in an increase of relational capital disclosure:
H6:		 There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	institutional	ownership	
and	relational	capital	disclosure.	
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Government Ownership
Conventionally, there is negative effect of government ownership 
on corporate performance (Qi, Wu & Zhang, 2000; Wei, Vogel, Ku & 
Zakalik, 2005; Lin & Zhang, 2009). This is because companies need 
to allocate political fund (Sapienza, 2004) for political intervention in 
government-owned companies (Gul, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). In 
Malaysia, government-linked companies (GLC) are directly controlled 
by the government through equity ownership by its investment arm, 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad. These companies are from a range of sectors 
i.e. financial, communication and media, utility, information technology 
and transportation. The relationship between government ownership and 
relational capital is positive for a number of reasons. First, consistent with 
the government’s aspiration to develop a knowledge-based economy, the 
implementation of this policy is to be conducted in GLCs. In fact, relational 
capital is important in a knowledge-based economy. Therefore, a higher 
government ownership results in higher relational capital disclosure. 
Second, companies influenced by government tend to form relationship or 
connection (including political connection) than other companies. These 
connection is deemed as maximization value by the management to assure 
a long term sustainability for the company, thus companies are inclined to 
disclose the information. A study by Chen, Ariff, Hassan, and Mohamad 
(2013) suggest that there is higher value of politically connected companies 
compared to non-politically connected companies “due to the expected value 
of preferential treatments, preference in project selections and access to state 
benefits” (page 477). Third, government acts on behalf of the public at large. 
Due to the pressure to present good investment made in the parliament, 
government may request investee companies to provide a comprehensive 
report regarding the strength of the companies by voluntarily disclosing 
relational capital. Thus, consistent with Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and 
Alazzani (2016), it can be expected:
H7:		 There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	government	ownership	
and	relational	capital	disclosure
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RESEARCH METHOD 
However, this research sample focused on companies in technology industry 
that are listed on the Main and ACE Market of Bursa Malaysia. Technology-
based companies were chosen because their business activities and operation 
rely more on intellectual capital (and hence relational capital) than other 
industries. In general, companies in the technology industry disclose 44% 
of relational capital items, 38% of structural capital items and 18% of 
human capital items. 
According to prior research (Guthrie & Petty 2000; Brennan 2001; 
Bozzolan, Favotto & Ricceri, 2003; Abeysekara & Guthrie 2004), the data 
was collected from published annual reports in 2011 to 2013. Annual report 
is company document that is issued to the public either in printed (Campbell, 
2000) or online form (Kamarulbaraini & Khairul 2005; Iqbal 2005), which 
has a significant influence on capital market and public perception about the 
company (Anderson & Epstein, 1995). The latest annual reports available at 
the time of this study was in 2013. The annual reports were obtained from 
the Bursa Malaysia website. There were 229 technology companies involved 
and the breakdown according to year and type of market is as follows:
Table 1: Sample
Year
Number of Observations
2013 2012 2011
Main Market (Technology Industry) 21 30 31
ACE Market 22 63 62
TOTAL 43 93 93
The dependent variable is the level of relational capital disclosure 
(RCD). There are seven (7) independent variables tested in this study 
namely board size (BRDSIZE), board independence (BRDIND), multiple 
directorship (MULTIDIR), managerial ownership (MGROWN), family 
ownership (FAMOWN), institutional ownership (INSTOWN) and 
government ownership (GOVOWN). Control variables are company size 
(COSIZE), leverage (LEV) and profitability (PROFIT). 
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RCDit = β0 + β1BRDSIZE it + β2BRDIND it + β3MULTIR it + 
β4MGROWN it + β5FAMOWNit + β6INSTOWN it + β7GOVOWN it + 
β8COSIZE it + β9LEV it + β10PROFIT it + ε it …..(1)
RCD = Relational capital disclosure
Β = Coefficient
BRDSIZE = Board size
BRDIND = Board independence
MILTIDIR = Multiple directorship
MGROWN = Managerial ownership
FAMOWN = Family ownership
INSTOWN = Institutional ownership
GOVOWN = Government ownership
COSIZE = Company size
LEV = Leverage
PROFIT = Profitability
Ε = Errors
i, t =  Company and year subscripts, respectively
Relational capital disclosure (RCD) is measured based on the total 
score of relational capital index. The index is developed based on conceptual 
model of Goerzen (2007) and Garcia-Meca & Martinez (2007). From 
“alliance network” standpoint, Goerzen (2007) suggests that geographical 
diversity, repeated partnership, network size, international experience are 
among the factors that can determine company performance due to reduction 
in transaction cost. Based on this view and prior literature, Goerzen (2007) 
views companies tend to form networking with other companies to improve 
market access, reduce innovation time span and complement technology 
needed for performance. Overall, networking is viewed as an effort to reduce 
cost and uncertainties as well as creating competitive advantage. Due to the 
advantages, companies have the intention to disseminate the information 
regarding alliance network or relational capital to the stakeholders. Based on 
the model and prior literature, an index of relational capital was developed. 
It appears that Garcia-Meca & Martinez (2007) index is not comprehensive. 
Based on Goerzen (2007), four (4) elements were added to the index namely 
foreign ownership commitment, commitment in foreign subsidiary, repeated 
partnership and business geographical diversity. This study makes an 
improvement on the index, in which there are nine elements (9) that cover 
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sixteen (16) items in the index (see Appendix 1). The elements were not 
used in the measurement of dependent variable but only used as a guideline 
from the theory to derive the items. A non-weighted dichotomous approach 
(0,1) was applied. A value of one is given to an item if there is any disclosure 
about the item, and zero otherwise. The total value of for items disclosed 
within each company is regarded as Observed Disclosure (OD). While, in 
general a maximum point of 16 i.e. the Total Disclosure (TD) items of the 
index will become the denominator.
Data on the index was collected manually based on disclosure in 
company annual report. To deal with inherent judgment limitation and 
subjectivity, two coders and test on the difference in the coding were made 
to ensure data consistency. Adjustments were made where necessary. Then, 
the total disclosure score observed for each company (OD) was divided 
by the maximum disclosure score a company could get (TD), representing 
the relational capital disclosure (RDC) level. This study also adjusted non-
relevant items, where the items will be deducted from the total denominator.4 
The formula to measure Relational Capital Disclosure is as follows:
ΣOD
ΣTD
RCD  = ............... (2)
The definition of independent variables is as presented in Appendix 
2. The table summarizes measurement of variables used in this study. As 
indicated Table 1, company size (COSIZE), leverage (LEV) and profitability 
(PROFIT) are predicted to have positive relationship with relational capital 
disclosure. Company size, which is related to available resource, is predicted 
to have positive relationship with disclosure level (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; 
Eng & Mak, 2003 Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). On the other hand, leverage is 
related to committed costs which give rise to business risk (Embong, Mohd 
Saleh & Hassan, 2012). Thus, to reduce the perceived risk, companies tend 
to provide more disclosure. Also, profitable companies have the incentive 
to distinguish themselves from less profitable companies (one way to do 
this is through voluntary information disclosure) to raise capital on the best 
available terms (Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995). The effect of board listing 
or ACE market (MAIN) on RCD is included. Young companies that belong 
4 Almost all observations have the same number of denominator, except two companies without foreign 
ownership and commitments. We deduct two items i.e. foreign ownership and foreign subsidiaries 
from the denominator of these two companies.
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to AE market (has less number of years prior to listing),5 are more eager to 
get external financing. Thus, these companies have more incentive to pass 
information through relational capital disclosure to get favorable terms 
from financier, as compared to companies from the Main market. As such, 
MAIN is predicted to be negatively related to relational capital disclosure.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Untabulated results shows that there are several popularly disclosed 
relational capital elements in annual reports of companies. It appears that 
the most disclosed element is customer relationship element i.e. related to 
trademark/brand/image and conference and training related to customers, 
followed by community relationship i.e. related to educational support 
and social responsibility. The results indicate that most companies have 
the intention to upgrade their reputation by signaling (disclosing) their 
trademark or brand or image in the annual report. This signaling is also 
highlighted in mission statement, where the forward looking information are 
disclosed to gain readers’ attention. Overall, these types of information are 
deemed important by the signaler such as company management for value 
creation to the customers, community at large, or shareholders (business 
itself).
An example of relational capital disclosure related to new business 
relationship is highlighted in HiTech Padu Berhad 2013 Annual Report, 
Review of Operations section, page 65: “We are proud to declare that the 
year 2013 saw HeiTech traversing foreign shores in the form of providing 
niche expertise to clients in East Asia, the Middle East and Africa, leveraging 
on the experience as one of the key players in elevating the Public Sector 
services to what it is today.”
Regarding disclosure of strategic alliance through agreement, an 
example is as follows: “In April 2013, ECS Astar signed a distribution 
agreement with Lenovo, the world’s largest personal computer (“PC”) 
maker, to introduce its entire range of smartphones to the domestic market. 
This effectively cemented our business relationship with Lenovo, which first 
5 Due to different listing requirements in the ACE Market (previously known as MESDAQ Market), 
accompanies are relatively smaller and younger than those listed on the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia (Md Nor, Mohd Saleh, Jaffar & Abdul Shukor, 2010)
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commenced in 2011 for notebook and desktop PCs. In the same month, ECS 
Astar also signed a business-to-business distribution agreement with ECSB’s 
long-time partner Samsung Malaysia Electronics Sdn Bhd to distribute its 
entire range of IT and mobility products to the enterprise market.” (ECS 
ICT Berhad, 2013 Annual Report, Review of Operations section, page 11). 
The disclosure is important for users to assess the company value creation 
ability in the future.  
Table 2 shows the total relational capital disclosure of the companies 
by years. Overall, there were 32.93% relational capital disclosure provided 
by companies in 2011, as compared to 32.33% in 2012 and 51.89% in 2013. 
There was a sharp increase in the relational capital disclosure in 2013. The 
increase in the disclosure level signifies the importance of relational capital 
in value creation process among the preparers.
Table 2: Relational Capital Disclosure 
Items 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % Total %
List of main customers 13 13.98 2 2.15 13 30.23 28 12.23
Market share (%) 18 19.35 15 16.13 18 41.86 51 22.27
New customers 19 20.43 31 33.33 19 44.19 69 30.13
Loyalty programme 19 20.43 17 18.28 19 44.19 55 24.02
Customers satisfaction 22 23.66 17 18.28 22 51.16 61 26.64
Conference or training related to 
customers 37 39.78 50 53.76 37 86.05 124 54.15
Product fulfil customers need 17 18.28 19 20.43 17 39.53 53 23.14
Trademark/ Brand/ Image 68 73.12 79 84.95 36 83.72 183 79.91
Education support 
Community projects 47 50.54 64 68.82 24 55.81 135 58.95
Joint ventures
Merger and acquisition 
Partnerships
49 52.69 45 48.39 25 58.14 119 51.97
Supply chain 
Distribution channel 21 22.58 17 18.28 20 46.51 58 25.33
Partnership agreement 
Strategic alliance and contract 35 37.63 26 27.96 22 51.16 83 36.24
Average age of foreign ownership 39 41.94 36 38.71 20 46.51 95 41.48
Average age of foreign subsidiaries 39 41.94 36 38.71 21 48.84 96 41.92
Total repeated partnerships 9 9.68 2 2.15 15 34.88 26 11.35
Sales by country or geographical 
segments 38 40.86 25 26.88 29 67.44 92 40.17
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Descriptive statistics of the data are provided in Table 3 below. The 
mean of relational capital disclosure is 37.2% across the three-year period. 
This result is lesser than the study done by Goh and Lim (2004), which was 
41%, while an earlier study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported 31.3% 
relational capital disclosure level. The difference was due to different sample 
period. Board size is used to reduce heteroscedasticity problem. It appears 
that on average, 45.3% of the total board members consist of independent 
members, nearly 20% of the members have three or more directorships in 
other companies, and about 17.7% of the shares are owned by management. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean s.d.
1.   RCD 0.372 0.219
2.   BRDSIZE 0.816 0.108
3.   BRDIND 0.453 0.150
4.   MILTIDIR 0.197 0.204
5.   MGROWN 0.177 0.189
6.   FAMOWN 0.009 0.042
7.   INSTOWN 0.035 0.095
8.   GOVOWN 0.002 0.015
9.   COSIZE 7.571 0.672
10. LEV 0.032 0.094
11. PROFIT -0.087 0.600
Based on correlation results presented in Table 4, the results appear to 
be consistent with our expectation. Multiple directorships, which represents 
director’s network is positively correlated with relational capital disclosure. 
Besides, there is a positive correlation between relational capital disclosure 
and institutional ownership, which indicates that pressure from sophisticated 
investment companies (the institutional investors) is effective to demand 
for relational capital disclosure. The correlation also suggests the higher 
managerial ownership, the lower relational capital disclosure, which is 
consistent with predicted relationship. Other than those correlations, it is also 
observed that board size is negatively correlated with board independence 
(r=-0.389), suggesting that additional board members that contribute to 
large board size are mainly non independent members. As company size 
increases, multiple directorships also increase. This result suggests the 
need for reputable but “busy” directors in large companies as compared to 
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small size companies. Overall, the correlation analysis also reveals that the 
highest correlation is only 48.9%, which is way below the threshold, raising 
a concern regarding multicollinearity issue. However, the existence of 
multicollinearity problem was tested by using VIF (variance inflation factor). 
Each variable was scanned for outliers. To deal with outliers, profitability 
variable was winsorised at the top and bottom 1% i.e. to the top and bottom 
1% level of the ranked variable. Winsorising technique limits outlier effect 
but at the same time retains the statistical properties of the variable.
Table 4: Correlation Analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1.   RCD 1.000 -.003 .023 .224** -.191** -.042 .138* .076 .109 .037 .033
2.   BRDSIZE 0.035 1.000 -.389** .027 .036 -.036 .053 .088 .226** .085 .160*
3.   BRDIND 0.000 -.331** 1.000 -.037 -.071 .007 .051 .023 -.091 -.059 -.012
4.   MILTIDIR 0.277** .019 -.068 1.000 -.081 -.048 .073 -.131* .141* .077 .081
5.   MGROWN -0.196** .017 -.071 -.062 1.000 .133 -.023 .099 -.096 .121 .033
6.   FAMOWN -0.067 .010 -.039 -.102 .173* 1.000 -.067 .123 -.065 -.051 .025
7.   INSTOWN 0.177** -.032 .069 .107 -.074 -.018 1.000 .025 .032 .154* .022
8.   GOVOWN 0.082 .105 .001 -.102 .051 .200** -.011 1.000 .011 .008 -.055
9.   COSIZE 0.154* .145* -.028 .101 -.035 -.067 -.010 .051 1.000 .404** .320**
10. LEV 0.025 -.002 .090 .102 .057 .033 -.007 .000 .130* 1.000 .033
11. PROFIT 0.057 .058 .086 -.031 .065 -.118 .017 .012 .489** -.153* 1.000
Note: Figures above (under) diagonal represents Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients. **, * denotes significant at 
1% and 5% levels (2-tailed) respectively.
The multivariate regression results are presented in Table 4.  T h e 
result shows that the OLS model is significant and 32% variance in 
relational capital disclosure are explained by independent variables. The 
second column shows random effect of the panel data analysis. The low 
VIF level suggests that multicollinearity is not a major concern. Both 
results are consistent. It appears that the variables that are significantly 
related to relational capital disclosure are strongly supported by signaling 
theory. As predicted, multiple directorships (H3), managerial ownership 
(H4), institutional ownerships (H6) and government ownership (H7) are 
significantly related to relational capital disclosure. 
The result for multiple directorships (H3) is consistent with prior 
literature on voluntary reporting using Malaysian data (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005) and non Malaysian data (Alfraih, 2016). Multiple directorships have 
helped companies to develop relationship with external parties and because 
networking is important for companies, managers have the intention to 
provide signal to users
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However, if the companies have large managerial ownership, relational 
capital disclosure is expected to be reduced (H4) i.e. managerial ownership 
is found to have negative relationship with relational capital disclosure. 
The result is found because share ownership by the management aligns the 
interest of shareholders with the management. As their interests are aligned, 
the necessity to provide additional disclosure is reduced, thus reducing 
the incentive for managers to signal information through relational capital 
disclosure. This result is consistent with a majority of prior literature such 
as Haddad, AlShattarat, AbuGhazaleh and Nobanee (2015).
The consistent with prior literature, information are disseminated due 
to demand of information from institutional owers (D’Souza, Ramesh and 
Min Shen, 2010; Iatridis, 2013). This result implies institutional owners are 
aware of the demand for information from the retail investors who invest 
in their company provides sufficient pressure for the company to disclose 
relational capital information (H6). 
The result for government ownership is consistent with Eng and 
Mak (2003) and Al-Janadi Abdul Rahman and Alazzani (2016), that 
government ownership influences voluntary disclosure positively (H7). The 
government, who represent the community at large may demand information 
to be disclosed, particularly with respect to business relationship with the 
community. It can also be said that the government that has aspirations to 
develop a knowledge based economy wanted to show the implementation 
of such policy is taken place in companies that they have investment in. 
Overall, these results imply that networks created from multiple 
directorships, institutional ownerships and government ownership influences 
positively the signaling behavior of managers, while internal ownership by 
management reduces the motivation to signal information. Therefore, H3, 
H4, H6 and H7 are supported. 
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Table 5: Multivariate Regression Results (N=229)
 Variables Predicted Sign
OLS
Coefficients
(t-Stats)
Panel Data
Random effect
Coefficients
(z-Stats)
Constant # -0.456*
(-1.867)
-0.449*
(-1.900)
BRDSIZE + 0.044
(0.319)
0.131
(0.326)
BRDIND + -0.043
(-0.426)
-0.025
(0.980)
MILTIDIR + 0.285***
(4.055)
0.274***
(4.140)
MGROWN - -0.172**
(-2.249)
-0.174**
(-2.350)
FAMOWN - -0.243
(-0.757)
-0.375
(-1.150)
INSTOWN + 0.498***
(3.113)
0.498***
(3.510)
GOVOWN + 1.551**
(1.735)
1.862**
(2.050)
COSIZE + 0.106***
(3.798)
0.098***
(3.710)
LEV + 0.056
(0.380)
0.055
(0.712)
PROFIT + -0.008
(-0.253)
-0.014
(-0.540)
MAIN - -0.160***
(-4.714)
-0.172***
(-5.040)
2011 # 0.008
(0.251) -
2013 # 0.125***
(3.216) -
R² 0.320 0.238
Adjusted R² 0.272 -
F Stat = 6.651*** Wald Chi2 = 66.98***
Highest VIF 1.936 Hausman Test not significant
Note: # No particular direction is expected. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (2-tailed) respectively.
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It is also interesting to note that although not hypothesized, younger 
companies (other than companies from the Main board –i.e. MAIN) are 
disclosing more relational capital information. This result is consistent with 
signaling theory that while lacking in terms of historical track records and 
assets, young companies have stronger incentives to signal information that 
may have positive impact to the company in the future.  
The results however do not support H1, H2 and H5. There are two main 
effects of board size (H1) i.e. it increases the ability of the board to make 
decision or it reduces the coordination within the board. Since these two 
effects suggest different effects on voluntary relational capital disclosure, 
the effect can be cancelling each other. The first effect may occur when 
board size is small, while the second effect may dominate when board size 
is large. We test on the non-linearity of board size relation with RCD in 
additional analyses. 
Although theoretically independent directors are related to effective 
monitoring on company activities (H2), the existence of the directors does 
not affect the level of relational capital disclosure. The result implies that 
independent directors who are expected to represent other than blokholders 
and controlling owners do not have sufficient motivation to demand for 
more relational capital information to be disclosed. The result is somewhat 
contradict prior literature (such as Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Li et al., 2008; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Lim, Matolcsy & Chow, 
2007; Hossain, 2008; Alfraih, 2016; Torchia & Calabrò, 2016). Some 
researchers relate the effectiveness of independent board members to grey 
directors i.e. while complying with the definition of independence, they are 
not truly independent. Finally, the effect of family ownership (H5). While 
it is expected to have a negative relationship with voluntary relational 
capital disclosure, the result is not significant. Further analysis of the nature 
of family owners is needed to find the reasons. Such investigation can be 
done utilizing a different theoretical framework on family dynamics and 
we recognize that it is beyond the scope of this study.
Additional Analyses
To test the possibility of non-linearity relation between board size and 
relational capital disclosure, BRDSIZE2 was introduced to the equation. 
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While the results for other variables are similar, BRDSIZE and BRDSIZE2 
are insignificantly related to relational capital disclosure. 
To deal with nonmorality of the residuals, normal transformation 
procedure as suggested by Cooke (1998) is employed in the multivariate 
analysis. The procedure effectively assigns rank to the non normal data and 
the ranks are transformed into numbers on normal distribution. Following 
method done by Young (1998), Van der Wardean approach of normal 
transformation is employed. This procedure is extensively used for corporate 
disclosure (Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013). The equation was estimated by using 
transformed data and the results are intact.
Bootstrapping and jacknife alternatives are also used to reestimate the 
standard errors. Bootstrapping is a general nonparametric approach and does 
not require distributional assumption (such as normally distributed errors), 
thus a more accurate inference can be drawn when the data is not well-
behaved or when the sample size is tiny. The results are similar to Table 4.
CONCLUSION
In this study, the agency and signaling theories are used to explain a specific 
relational capital disclosure in company annual report. This study contributes 
to the literature by examining the relationship between corporate governance 
elements (such as the characteristics of Board of Directors and the ownership 
structure of companies) and relational capital disclosure. Different from 
prior literature, alliance or network view is used in selecting variables and 
developing measurement and model. By doing this, the explanation on 
standing agency theory on disclosure is extended, with additional insight 
from signaling and network view. Relational capital disclosure is a good 
case to test this view. 
The results indicate that multiple directorships, institutional and 
government ownerships positively affect relational capital disclosure. 
Managerial ownership, on the other hand reduces managerial incentive to 
signal such information. In addition, younger companies are found to have 
higher incentive to disclose relational capital information as compared to 
more established companies. The results show that the important corporate 
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governance determinants of relational capital disclosure can be predicted 
when the management signaling intention and network or alliance argument 
are considered. 
Even the signaling and network perspective on relational capital 
disclosure is significant, the use of this perspective on other types of 
disclosure and public policy remains ambiguous. Future research may 
address this issue. The findings are useful for regulators in emerging 
countries with highly networked economy, whereas business and personal 
networks are important for company sustainability. However, specific 
character of different market also affects the management intention. 
Therefore, further studies on other markets may help in understanding the 
application of these perspectives on disclosure.
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APPENDIX 1: RELATIONAL CAPITAL DISCLOSURE 
INDEX
No. Elements Items Note (0,1)
1.
Customer 
relationships
List of main customers
2. Market share (%)
3. New customers
4. Loyalty programme
5. Customers satisfaction
6. Conference or training related to customers
7. Product fulfil customers need
8. Trademark/ Brand/ Image
9.
Community 
relationships: Social  
responsibility
Education support
Community projects
10.
Investments in new 
ventures
Joint ventures
Merger and acquisition
Partnerships
11. Supplier and distributor network
Supply chain
Distribution channel
12.
Strategic alliance and 
agreement Partnership agreementStrategic alliance and contract
13. Foreign ownership commitment Average age of foreign ownership
14. Commitment in subsidiaries Average age of foreign subsidiaries
15. Repeated partnerships Total repeated partnerships
16. Business geographical diversity Sales by country or geographical segments
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APPENDIX 2: DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES
Independent 
variables
Expected 
relationship 
with dependent 
variable
Range of 
values
Measurement (all measurement items are 
obtainable from annual reports)
BRDSIZE +
H1
>1 Total number of board members (Mohd 
Saleh, Mohd Iskandar & Rahmat, 2005)
BRDIND +
H2
0-1 The ratio of independent to total board 
members (Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar & 
Rahmat, 2005)
MILTIDIR +
H3
0-1 Percentage of external directors serving 
more than 3 corporate boards (Mohd Saleh, 
Mohd Iskandar & Rahmat, 2005)
MGROWN -
H4
0-1 Percentage of share ownership by 
executive directors (Mohd Saleh, Mohd 
Iskandar & Rahmat, 2005)
FAMOWN -
H5
0-1 Percentage of share ownership of more 
than 1% by families of the members of the 
board (Munir, Mohd Saleh & Yatim, 2013; 
Mohd Saleh & Omar 2014)
INSTOWN +
H6
0.05-1 Percentage of share ownership of more 
than 5% by institutional investors (e.g. 
Employees Provident Fund, insurance, 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad, commercial 
and investment banks) (Ahmad, Mohd 
Saleh, Mohd Iskandar & Alias, 2011)
GOVOWN +
H7
0.05-1 Percentage of share ownership of more 
than 5% by the Government Linked 
Companies 
COSIZE +
(Guthrie, Petty& 
Ricceri, 2006)
>1 Log of total assets (Guthrie, Petty & Ricceri, 
2006)
LEV +
(Gerpott, 
Thomas & 
Hoffmann, 2008; 
Hossain, Perera 
& Rahman,1995)
0-1 The ratio of total liability to total assets 
(Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar & Rahmat, 
2005)
PROFIT +
(Singhvi & Desai 
1971; Patton & 
Zelenka 1997; 
Owusu-Ansah 
1998)
Negative 
to 
positive
The ratio of net profit to total assets 
(Hassan, Mohd Saleh, Yatim & Che Abdul 
Rahman, 2012)
MAIN - 1,0 If a company belongs to the Main board = 1, 
otherwise, 0
